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Warsaw Convention - Limited Liability - Notice
On 26 February 1960, while enroute from Rome to New York, an
aircraft owned and operated by Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A. crashed
shortly after taking off from an intermediate stop at Shannon, Ireland.
Five suits were brought for wrongful death, personal injuries, and property
damage allegedly'suffered by thirteen of the passengers aboard the air-
craft, and were consolidated in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York. In answer to the complaints, Alitalia
plead as affirmative defenses those Articles of the Warsaw Convention'
which serve to exclude or limit an air carrier's liability to its passengers
in the event of death or personal injury or loss of or damage to baggage.'
Prior to trial, plaintiffs moved for a partial summary judgment to dismiss
the affirmative defenses. Plaintiffs asserted that these defenses were not
available because Alitalia had failed to deliver a passenger ticket and bag-
gage check properly notifying the passengers that the Convention limita-
tions applied to the flight, as required by Articles 3 and 4 of the Con-
vention.' Alitalia maintained that the defenses and limitations of liability
' Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air (hereinafter cited as the Warsaw Convention), 29 Oct. 1934, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876
(concluded at Warsaw, Poland, 12 Oct. 1929).
'Warsaw Convention, art. 20(1), 49 Stat. 3019, T.S. No. 876, provides that: "The carrier
shall not be liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid
the damage or that it was impossible for him or them to take such measures."
Warsaw Convention, art. 21, 49 Stat. 3019, T.S. No. 876, provides: "If the carrier proves
that the damage was caused by or contributed to by the negligence of the injured person the
court may, in accordance with the provisions of its own law, exonerate the carrier wholly or
partly from his liability."
Warsaw Convention, art. 22, 49 Stat. 3019, T.S. No. 876, provides in part:
(1) In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier for each passen-
ger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs [approximately $8,300] ...
Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier and the passenger may agree to a
higher limit of liability.
(2) In the transportation of checked baggage and of goods the carrier shall be
limited to a sum of 250 francs per kilogram [approximately $7 per pound], unless
the consignor has made, at the time when the package was handed over to the
carrier, a special declaration of the value at delivery and has paid a supplementary
sum. ...
aWarsaw Convention, art. 3, 49 Stat. 3015, T.S. No. 876, provides:
(1) For the transportation of passengers the carrier must deliver a passenger ticket
which shall contain the following particulars:
(a) The place and date of issue;
(b) The place of departure and of destination;
(c) The agreed stopping places, provided that the carrier may reserve the
right to alter the stopping places in case of necessity, and that if he exercises
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for death or injury applied as long as the carrier had delivered a ticket to
the passenger before departure, even though the ticket did not contain
the proper notice. Although Alitalia claimed further that the ticket had
in fact contained such notice, the district court granted. plaintiff's motion
to strike the defenses. Trial was stayed pending a determination by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on the controlling
question of whether the challenged defenses were available to Alitalia on
the basis of the facts presented. Defendant's application for leave to
appeal was granted pursuant to the Interlocutory Appeals Act.4 Held,
affirmed: Although a literal reading of Article 3 (2) of the Convention
deprives the carrier of limited liability only where the carrier fails to
deliver a ticket to the passenger before departure, the sanction also applies
when the ticket fails to include a statement that the Convention's limita-
tions apply to the flight. The court further held that the statement con-
cerning limited liability given in the Alitalia ticket in question was con-
cealed by exceedingly small print and could not have given the necessary
notice to the passengers. Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 253
F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
granted, 389 U.S. 926 (1967).
I. WARSAW CONVENTION-BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENTS
The Warsaw Convention of 1929, a multilateral, legislative treaty,'
that right, the alteration shall not have the effect of depriving the transporta-
tion of its international character;
(d) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(e) A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules relating to
liability established by this convention.
(2) The absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger ticket shall not affect the
existence or the validity of the contract of transportation, which shall nonetheless
be subject to the rules of this convention. Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts a
passenger without a passenger ticket having been delivered he shall not be entitled
to avail himself of those provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his
liability.
Warsaw Convention, art. 4, 49 Stat. 3015-16, T.S. No. 876, provides:
(1) For the transportation of baggage, other than small personal objects of which
the passenger takes charge himself, the carrier must deliver a baggage check.
(2) The baggage check shall be made out in duplicate, one part for the passenger
and the other part for the carrier.
(3) The baggage check shall contain the following particulars:
(a) The place and date of issue;
(b) The place of departure and of destination;
(c) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(d) The number of the passenger ticket;
(e) A statement that delivery of the baggage will be made to the bearer of
the baggage check;
(f) The number and weight of the packages;
(g) The amount of the value declared in accordance with article 22(2);
(h) A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules relating to
liability established by this convention.
(4) The absence, irregularity, or loss of the baggage check shall not affect the
existence or the validity of the contract of transportation which shall nonetheless
be subject to the rules of this convention. Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts baggage
without a baggage check having been delivered, or if the baggage check does not
contain the particulars set out at (d), (f), and (h) above, the carrier shall not
be entitled to avail himself of those provisions of the convention which exclude or
limit his liability [Emphasis added.].
428 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964).
sThe "legislative treaty" is a modern term applied to agreements in which the parties have
identical aims. The Warsaw Convention seems to fall within this classification rather than within
the older "contractual" type, in which the parties have separate interests, such as the buyer and
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long recognized as an important legal development, is today the most
widely accepted treaty in the area of commercial law.' Promulgated at
a time when the aviation industry was in its infancy, the Convention
had two primary goals: first, to establish a uniform system of law in the
growing area of international air transportation; second, to protect the
infant air transport industry by providing a limitation on the carrier's
liability for death or injury to passengers and damage to baggage and
cargo.' Although these goals have been attained to a substantial degree,
and the Convention is widely recognized as being of vital importance,
it is presently the center of a storm of controversy and over the past
fifteen years has been the subject of constant negotiations.
Most of the criticism of the Convention has come from the United
States, and has centered on Article 22, which limits carrier liability for
death or injury to 8,300 dollars. The economic strength of the American
air industry and public dissatisfaction with the treaty's low damage limi-
tations prompted the United States government to request that an inter-
national conference be convened to attempt to revise the Warsaw Conven-
tion. In 1955, such a conference was convened in the Netherlands, which
resulted in proposed amendments to the Warsaw Convention: The Hague
Protocol. Basically, The Hague Protocol doubles the damage limitation to
16,600 dollars, and makes it more difficult to recover actual damages over
the limitation! The amendments proposed by The Hague Protocol have
become part of the Convention only in those nations that have ratified it.
Although the United States has signed the Protocol, Senate ratification has
never been possible, on the basis that even a doubled limit is too low."0
On 15 November 1965, the United States formally denounced the War-
saw Convention, such denunciation to become effective six months later
in accordance with Article 39." During the next six months interested
parties all over the world, such as domestic and foreign airlines, the Inter-
national Air Transport Association (IATA), and various foreign govern-
ments, in an effort to save the basic concept of the Convention, engaged
in constant negotiations. The result was an "interim agreement" (also
known as the Montreal Agreement and the CAB Agreement) which is
based on individual contracts between carriers and passengers as provided
for in the Convention." With the agreement of most foreign airlines to
seller in a commercial contract. See A. McNAIR, LAW OF TREATIES 739-54 (2d ed. 1961). The
concept of identical interests is important when the potential effects of the Lisi decision are con-
sidered.
6 D. BILLYOu, AIR LAW 124 (2d ed. 1964). For a list of the more than 90 nations that are
signatory to the Warsaw Convention, see TREATY AFFAIRS STAFF, OFFICE OF THE LEGAL AD-
VISOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 227 (1966).
Warsaw Convention, art. 22, 49 Stat. 3019, T.S. No. 876.
'D. BILLYOU, supra note 6.
'For a full discussion of The Hague Protocol, see Beaumont, The Warsaw Convention of 1929
as Amended by the Protocol Signed at The Hague on Sept. 28, 1955, 22 J. AIR L. & COM. 414
(1955); Calkins, Grand Canyon, Warsaw and The Hague Protocol, 23 J. AIR L. & COM. 253
(1956); Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Report on the Warsaw Convention as Amend-
ed by The Hague Protocol, 26 J. AIR L. & COM. 255 (1959).
1" The Hague Protocol has never been called up for a vote in the Senate, and with the for-
mulation of the Montreal Agreement, may well be considered a dead issue as far as the United
States is concerned. For a complete discussion of the history of The Hague Protocol in the United
States Senate see Kreindler, The Denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, 31 J. AIR L. & COM.
291, 297-302 (1965).
n Dep't of State Press Release No. 268 (15 Nov. 1965).
" Warsaw Convention, art. 22(1), 49 Stat. 3019, T.S. No. 876.
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adhere to the Montreal Agreement, the United States withdrew its de-
nunciation of the Convention."3 Basically, the Montreal Agreement covers
all international flights departing from, terminating in, or with an agreed
stopping place in the United States, and provides for a maximum liability
of 75,000 dollars (58,000 dollars exclusive of legal fees) and absolute
liability of the part of the carrier. 4
Thus, although the Warsaw Convention is still in effect, it is subject
in some cases to the Montreal Agreement and in others to The Hague Pro-
tocol; and even now, constant attempts are being made to find a satis-
factory replacement for the Convention and' its supplementary agree-
ments.'" Even while attempts are being made to preserve the Warsaw
Convention system of liability in international air transport, there is a
movement to take the United States out of any such system entirely.
Advocates of the limited liability concept consider it vital to international
air law. 6 Proponents of unlimited liability have attacked the Convention
on economic, moral, and sociological grounds.'
It is within this context that the Lisi decision must be viewed. If affirmed
by the Supreme Court, Lisi will greatly expand the conditions under which
the carrier may lose its limited liability and could present the carriers with
great problems. Extreme views believe that Lisi alone could result in the
virtual destruction of the Convention.
II. Lisi v. ALITALIA-LINEE AEREE ITALIANE, S.p.A.
When the Warsaw Convention applies, as in Lisi, 9 Articles 17 and 18
create a presumption of liability on the part of the carrier for death or
injury to passengers and for damage or destruction to check baggage or
cargo.'" As stated, this liability is limited by Article 22 to approximately
$8,300 for death or injury to each passenger and to approximately seven
" Dep't of State Press Release No. 110 (13 May 1966); Dep't of State Press Release No. 111
(14 May 1966), 32 J. AIR L. & COM. 247-48 (1966). There remains some question as to whether
a denunciation may be withdrawn once it has been submitted, since such is not provided for in
the Convention. However, this question is not likely to be raised since the general consensus is
that the United States must be kept in the Convention in order to preserve the Warsaw system.
'" Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and The Hague Pro-
tocol, CAB Docket No. 17325, CAB Order No. E-23680 (13 May 1966). For a list of the eighty-
nine participating carriers as of 31 May 1967, see CAB Press Release No. 67-80, 382-6031 (31 May
1967).
IS The United States is continuing efforts to find a satisfactory replacement for both the War-
saw Convention and The Hague Protocol, with increases in limits of up to $100,000 or more.
See PANEL OF EXPERTS ON LIMITS FOR PASSENGERS UNDER THE WARSAW CONVENTION AND
THE HAGUE PROTOCOL, Report on the Work of the Second Session, PE-Warsaw Report-2 (18 July
1967).
1 See generally Hildred, Air Carriers' Liability: Significance of the Warsaw Convention and
Events Leading up to the Montreal Agreement, 33 J. AIR L. & Com. 521 (1967); Martin, The
Defendant's View of Montreal, 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 538 (1967); Sand, Risk in the Air and the
Myth of Fault, 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 594 (1967).
"'See generally Kreindler, A Plaintiff's View of Montreal, 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 528 (1967);
Kreindler, The Denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, 31 J. AIR L. & COM. 291 (1965);
Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Report on the Warsaw Convention as Amended by
The Hague Protocol, 26 J. AIR L. & CoM. 255, 268 (1959).
" Caplan, Insurance, Warsaw Convention, Changes Made Necessary by the 1966 Agreement
and Possibility of Denunciation of the Convention, 33. J. AIR L. & CoM. 663, 669-70 (1967).
" The Lisi case presented no real question of Warsaw applicability. It is important to note
that this case did not involve the Montreal Agreement, but could have an effect on future litiga-
tion under the Agreement.
"
0 Warsaw Cnvention, art. 17, 49 Stat. 3018, T.S. No. 876; Warsaw Convention, art. 18,
49 Stat. 3019, T.S. No. 876.
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dollars per pound for checked baggage." The presumption of liability may
be rebutted, and the carrier may escape liability altogether in some cases,
if the carrier "proves that he and his agents have taken all necessary
measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible ... to take such
measures."'" Further, if the carrier can show that damage to baggage was
caused by pilot error and that the carrier had taken all necessary measures
to prevent the damage, there may be no liability for damage to baggage
or goods."
A carrier will be precluded from availing itself of both the limitations
of liability and the defenses allowed under the Convention, and will be
subject to absolute and unlimited liability if the plaintiff can establish:
(1) that the accident was caused by the "wilful misconduct" of the car-
rier,'" or
(2) that the carrier accepted the passenger without having delivered a
ticket as required by Article 3, or
(3) that even if a ticket was delivered to the passenger, delivery was not
adequate to satisfy Article 3 (2)."
The Lisi decision opens another avenue to the plaintiff, that of requiring
that, first, the required notice be so printed on the ticket as to draw the
passenger's attention, and, second, that the notice be so worded as to give
adequate notice of the Convention's application and effect.
The Second Circuit accomplished the above result by concluding that
the delivery requirement in Article 3 not only requires physical delivery
of a ticket, but that the ticket contain adequate notice of the applicability
of the Warsaw Convention. Alitalia contended that the court's interpre-
tation was not supported either by the structure of the Convention's
traffic document sections or by the diplomatic history of the Convention,
and that the court exceeded the bounds of treaty interpretation as estab-
lished by the Supreme Court."
A comparison of the Convention's traffic document articles discloses a
significant distinction between Article 3 and Articles 4" and 9." All three
Articles require the delivery of the applicable document and specify in-
formation to be printed on the document. All three imposed the sanction
21 Warsaw Convention, art. 22, 49 Stat. 3019, T.S. No. 876.
22 Warsaw Convention, art. 20, 49 Stat. 3019, T.S. No. 876.
23 Id.
'Warsaw Convention, art. 25(1), 49 Stat. 3019, T.S. No. 876.
"Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816
(1965); Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965).
2 The United States Constitution makes treaties part of the supreme law of the land, placing
them on the same level as federal statutes, U.S. Const. art. IV. It is a familiar rule of United
States courts that treaties must be construed so as to give effect to the intentions of the parties to
the treaties. In attempting to give effect to the parties intentions, courts give a reasonable and
sensible interpretation by examining the treaty as a whole and by taking the words in their or-
dinary meaning as understood in the public law of nations. Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech, 311 U.S.
150 (1950); Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5 (1936); Santovicenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30
(1931). Courts are not restricted to the written words of a treaty, but may look to the nego-
tiations and diplomatic correspondence of the contracting parties and to those parties' own practical
construction of its terms. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933); Nielson v. Johnson,
279 U.S. 47 (1928). While courts may interpret a treaty liberally, they must take it as they find
it, and may neither add to nor detract from its provisions. Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S.
5 (1936).
"Warsaw Convention, art. 3, 49 Stat. 3015, T.S. No. 876; Warsaw Convention, art. 4, 49
Stat. 3015, T.S. No. 876.
"4Warsaw Convention, art. 9, 49 Stat. 3017, T.S. No. 876.
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of absolute and unlimited liability when the document is not delivered.
However, in addition, Articles 4(4) and 9 expressly impose the sanction
of absolute and unlimited liability if the baggage check and air waybill
fail to contain certain required particulars, one of which is a statement
that the carriage is subject to the Convention's rules on liability. In the
case of the passenger ticket, Article 3 (2) imposes the sanction only in a
case of non-delivery. Alitalia contended that because of the difference in
the articles, no notice was required in the passenger ticket. This conclusion,
when advanced by Alitalia, was rejected by the Second Circuit. The court
stated that "[i]t is apparent that Alitalia relies on a literal reading of the
Convention for its assertions. We reject the interpretation it urges upon
us.,
Instead, the court relied on two cases, neither of which were quite on
point, and on a concept of what constitutes the overall purpose of the
Convention. In Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc.,"° a military officer was
presented with a ticket after he was already on board the aircraft. After
the aircraft crashed, the Second Circuit was called upon to determine
whether or not the ticket was presented in time so as to constitute delivery
under Article 3 (2). The court reasoned that it would be illogical to re-
quire the ticket to contain a warning of the applicability of the Conven-
tion if it were not implied that the ticket must be delivered in such cir-
cumstances as to allow the passenger the opportunity to take self-protec-
tive measures, such as the purchase of trip insurance." The court went on
to hold that, as a matter of law, delivery was inadequate and that no ticket
had been delivered as required by Article 3 (2).
A short time later, in Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc.,"2 the Ninth
Circuit reached a similar decision. There, the military passenger was given
a "boarding pass" at the foot of the aircraft boarding ramp. Following
the Mertens decision, the court found that the function of the delivery
requirement was to apprise the passengers of the Convention's limited
liability so that self-protective measures might be taken, and that thel
ticket has not been so delivered."
The Second Circuit reached its decision in Lisi by applying a liberal
interpretation to the delivery requirement of Article 3. Following the
reasoning in Mertens and Warren the court found that the only logical
reason to require adequate delivery of a passenger ticket was to allow the
passenger time to take measures to protect himself financially against pos-
sible death or bodily injury. Extending this reasoning one step further,
the court determined that the Convention required that the ticket con-
tain adequate notice of the limited liability, or there could be no reason
to require delivery. In effect, therefore, the Lisi court has merged the
concepts of actual physical delivery of a ticket and delivery of notice with
that ticket, rather than treating them as separate requirements of the
Convention.
The Second Circuit also relied on what it considered to be the "overall
purposes of the Convention" for its decision in Lisi.' The court char-
29 370 F.2d at 511.
30341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965).
31 d. at 857.
32352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965).
33 Id. at 498.
34 370 F.2d at 512.
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acterized the limitations of liability as "arbitrary" and "advantageous to the
carrier," and emphasized the fact that the Convention has recently come
under severe criticism." Commenting on the "one-sided advantage" enjoyed
by the airlines, the court stated:
[T]he quid pro quo for this one-sided advantage is delivery to the passenger
of a ticket and baggage check which give him notice that on the air trip he
is about to take, the amount of recovery to him or his family in the event of
a crash, is limited very substantially."
Having determined that Article 3 (2) of the Warsaw Convention does
require that the ticket contain notice of Convention applicability just as
Articles 4(4) and 9 for baggage checks and air waybills, the court pro-
ceeded to examine the documents involved in the Lisi case. The documents
involved were the standard passenger ticket and baggage check, the form
of which was established and required by the International Air Transport
Association (IATA), and which are in general use throughout the inter-
national airline industry. On the front of the ticket and the baggage
check was the statement directing the passenger to examine "the Condi-
tions on page 4."" The conditions to which the passenger's attention
was directed included, among others, a statement that the carrier was sub-
ject to the Warsaw Convention. Further, each flight coupon contained
immediately under the passenger's name the statement:
If the passenger's journey involves an ultimate destination or stop in a coun-
try other than the country of departure, the Warsaw Convention may be
applicable and the Convention governs and in most cases limits the liability
of carriers for death or personal injury and in respect of loss of or damage
to baggage."
The Second Circuit characterized the above statements as being printed
in "exceedingly small print,"' and agreed with the district court that the
notice contained in the ticket and baggage check was:
[C]amouflaged in Lilliputian print in a thicket of "Conditions of Con-
tract.... .. Indeed the exculpatory statements on which defendant relies
are vitually invisible. They are ineffectively positioned . . . and unemphasized
by boldface type, . . . or anything else. The simple truth is that their
presence is concealed."'
The court also noted that even had the notices been printed in sufficiently
large type, it would be "highly questionable whether he [the passenger]
would be able to understand the meaning of the language contained
thereon." As examples of unclear language, the court noted that the
passenger was referred to the carrier's filed tariffs in order to determine
'1Id. at 512-13.
a6Id. at 513.
"Brief for Defendant at 24, Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Acree Italiane, S.p.A., 370 F.2d 508 (2d
Cir. 1966), cert. granted, 389 U.S. 926 (1967).
as For a reproduction of the ticket cover and the conditions, see Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree
Italiane, S.p.A., 253 F. Supp. 237, 240-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
as See reproduction of ticket coupon, Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 253 F. Supp.
237, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
40370 F.2d at 513.
+'Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 253 F. Supp. 237, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
4'370 F.2d at 514 n.10.
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whether his flight was international carriage, and that the carrier's liability
was expressed in French gold francs.43
The Second Circuit based its decision partly on public policy; because
limited liability for personal death or injury is unfamiliar in the United
States, notice is of special importance." Commenting further on the im-
portance of the notice requirement to United States citizens, the court
stated: "It is too much to expect these passengers to be sufficiently sophisti-
cated to realize that although they are traveling the same number of miles
on an international flight that they have frequently traveled domestically,
the amount they may recover in the event of an accident is drastically
reduced."
III. LisI: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
This writer disagrees with the decision reached by the Second Circuit.
Although the Lisi result may seem to be logical and reasonable, it is not
proper treaty interpretation.
As previously noted, Article 3 (2) imposes the sanction of absolute and
unlimited liability only in cases of non-delivery, whereas Articles 4(4)
and 9 extend it to cases of inadequate notice. The court's rejection of the
importance of this distinction seems to be in conflict with the earlier case
of Grey v. American Airlines, Inc." In Grey, plaintiff contended that the
sanction in Article 3 applied on the ground that the ticket omitted one
of the agreed stopping places as required by that Article. The district court,
in an opinion adopted by the Second Circuit, rejected this contention,
stating:
Article 3 (2) merely requires that the ticket be delivered to the passenger and
thus clearly differs from Articles 4(4) and 9. I must conclude that this
omission or difference is most significant. For I cannot agree with plaintiffs
argument . . . when those who drafted the treaty were so explicit in this
regard in Articles 4(4) and 9 [Emphasis added.]."
The Second Circuit dismissed Alitalia's reliance on Grey as being "mis-
placed." ' The court stated that in Grey there had been "delivery" of a
ticket as required, and that the technical omission did not change the
international character of the flight.49
The difference between Article 3 and Articles 4(4) and 9 is further
emphasized by the history of negotiation of the Convention. The pre-
liminary draft of Article 3, prepared in 1928, contained the following
sanction:
[I]f the ticket does not contain the particulars indicated above . . . the
carrier will not be able to avail himself of those provisions of this Convention
which exclude in whole or in part his liability direct or derived from the




46227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956), aff'g, 95 F. Supp. 756
(S.D.N.Y. 1950).
4 Grey v. American Airlines, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 756, 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
4' 370 F.2d at 513 n.8.
49 Id.
'0IME CONFERENCE INTERN'ATIONALE DE DROIT PRIVE AERIEN, ICAO Doc. No. 7838, at
167-68.
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The drafting committee, however, believed that the sanction was too
severe to impose for the omission of one or any of the particulars, and
so deleted the words "or if the ticket does not contain the particulars
indicated above."'" The minutes of the drafting conference, therefore, re-
flect the presence of an intent to impose the sanction only if there was
no delivery of the ticket. This distinction was recognized by Dr. Goedhuis"
in the first critical analysis of the Convention." Goedhuis concluded that,
however illogical it may seem, since the Convention had not provided for
any sanctions for such omissions, the carrier is not deprived of the limited
liability or defenses of the Convention if the ticket delivered does not
contain the particulars listed in Article 3 (1).54
At The Hague Conference of 19 5 5, the United States government clearly
indicated that it recognizes that Article 3 of the Convention does not
require that "notice" of limited liability appear on the ticket. At the
conference, the United States delegate proposed that the Convention be
amended so as to extend the sanction in Article 3 (2) to situations where
the passenger ticket fails to notify the passenger of the liability limits for
personal injury or death." During the ensuing debate, the conference
delegates consistently recognized that the sanction does not apply under
the original Article 3 (2) for failure to deliver notice." The amendment,
which reads "or if the ticket does not include the notice required by para-
graph 1 (c) of this Article. . . ."" was eventually adopted by the con-
ference, though never ratified by the United States Senate. It appears,
therefore, that the United States government as well as foreign nations
recognize an interpretation of Article 3 (2) that is diametrically opposed
to that applied by the Second Circuit in Lisi.
In both of the cases on which the court did rely, Mertens and Warren,
the question presented was whether or not there had been adequate de-
livery of a ticket, and not whether the ticket itself was adequate. Even
though in Mertens the court did indicate that the type was too small, both
courts assumed that the notice was present and that the passenger would
have been able to take self-protective measures if there had been time to
read the ticket. While it is logical to conclude that since a ticket must be
delivered properly it must therefore contain readable notice, such a con-
clusion would seem to be in opposition to the intent of the drafters of
the treaty. At the same time, it is illogical to assume that the drafters
expressly deleted a provision of such importance and then failed to ex-
press their intent in another way.
As noted, the Second Circuit seemed to believe that the only thing
available to the passenger to offset limited liability of the carrier was
notice. As stated in the dissent:
The majority do not approve of the terms of the treaty and, therefore, by
"id. at 101-02, 129.
5 D. GOEDHUIS, NATIONAL AIRLEGISLATIONS AND THE WARSAW CONVENTION (1937).
"See also H. DRION, LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW 1, 251 (1954);
C. SHAWCROSS & K. BEAUMONT, AIR LAW § 406(c) (2d ed. 1951).
14 D. GOEDHUIS, supra note 52, at 152.
"See, e.g., I ICAO, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AIR LAW 1955, at 66-91,
ICAO Doc. No. 7686-LC/140 (1956).
56 Id.
"YFor the text of The Hague Protocol, see C. SHAWCROSS & K. BEAUMONT, AIR LAW
xvii-xxvii (2d Supp., 2d ed. 1955).
[Vol. 3 3
CURRENT LEGISLATION AND DECISIONS
judicial fiat, they rewrite it. They think a "one-sided advantage" is being
taken of the passenger which must be offset by a judicial requirement that
the passenger have notice of the limitation of liability."
Assuming for discussion that the ticket is required to contain notice of
the Convention's applicability, other important advantages given the pas-
senger as quid pro quo for limited liability, and disregarded in the ma-
jority's opinion are:
(1) The Convention provides for a uniform presumption of liability,"
without which the plaintiff would be required to prove negligence of the
carrier, often with only res ipsa loquitur on which to rely.
(2) The plaintiff is given a choice of four separate forums in which the
action may be brought, allowing him to choose the most convenient."0
(3) The Convention provides for a uniformity of law among the various
nations in which the action may be brought.
(4) The passenger is protected from lower limits, either those provided
by statute or otherwise valid contractual waivers of liability.6'
(5) In the absence of special circumstances, the passenger is not subjected
to lengthy litigation, which may last for years.
In addition, when the court recognized that the treaty has come under
severe criticism, it failed to mention that that criticism has centered
around the low liability limits, and not the relative position of the carrier
and the passenger created by the Convention. 2 Even though a court dis-
agrees with the "one-sidedness" of a treaty as here, it remains that court's
duty to sanction and enforce the performance of the treaty according to
the intent of the drafters until the government chooses to officially de-
nounce and withdraw from the agreement.'
In stating that, in the United States, notice of limited liability for per-
sonal death or injury is of special importance, the court was absolutely
correct, and normally public policy is quite strict in this area. However,
the court failed to consider that a treaty, being part of the supreme law
of the land, displaces conflicting public policy doctrines of both state and
federal courts. By entering into the Convention, the United States govern-
ment announced the terms of the Convention as the public policy of the
nation. The court also failed to note that a number of states within the
United States do in fact have limited liability systems in connection with
their wrongful death statutes.
As to the court's references to the ticket statements not being under-
standable, it is quite true that many passengers would not fully understand
the legal effect of the Convention from reading the statements in the
ticket. While true that the examples may not be "understandable" to the
average passenger, the fact is that nothing more is required of the carrier
under the Convention. Nothing in the Convention requires the carrier to
interpret "international flight" for the passenger, and even in the United
"s3 7 0 F.2d at 515.
"°Warsaw Convention, art. 17, 49 Stat. 3018, T.S. No. 876; Warsaw Convention, art. 18,
49 Stat. 3019, T.S. No. 876.
"°Warsaw Convention, art. 28, 49 Stat. 3020, T.S. No. 876.
o Warsaw Convention, art. 23, 49 Stat. 3019, T.S. No. 876.
62 In its denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, the United States government specified that
the reason for such denunciation was the low liability limit. See Dep't of State Press Release No.
268 (15 Nov. 1965).
' Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933).
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States, properly filed tariffs constitute notice to a passenger or shipper."
Further, the Convention itself speaks in terms of liability in French gold
francs, and the use of a gold conversion standard provides a basic, stable
valuation for most currencies. Since under the Warsaw Convention, many
citizens of countries other than the United States bring actions in this
country, the question arises as to whether a court following the Lisi
rationale would require that the statements be printed in that plaintiff's
native language and liability expressed in his native currency in order to
be understandable.
IV. LIsI: PROBLEMS AND EFFECTS
The notice requirements of Lisi give rise to a number of problems.
Simply deciding whether or not the Convention applies to a particular
flight or not is often a problem in itself. Convention applicability depends
on the overall contract of carriage entered into by the parties." In light
of the complexity of modern travel, which may originate, enter, and end
in numerous countries and which may involve several successive carriages,
the question of whether a particular flight falls within the Convention is
one which often baffles aviation lawyers." It was because of this very
difficulty that the Convention was amended by The Hague Protocol to
provide for a statement that the flight may be subject to the limited
liability " rather than a statement that it is so subject. Since the United
States has not ratified The Hague Protocol, the original Warsaw Conven-
tion, as supplemented by the Montreal Agreement, is in effect in this
country, and requires a definite statement that the Convention is applic-
able. "s The Second Circuit would seem to require that the carrier inquire
into each passenger's overall travel plans and then, having made a de-
termination of the legal status of the carriage, fully explain the Conven-
tion's applicability and effect.
Another problem arises for the carrier when the contract of carriage
involves notice of Hague's higher limits of liability. " If an action were
brought in another country on the basis of Hague carriage, would the
courts there recognize the Warsaw notice required by the Second Circuit,
or do the carriers have to provide separate tickets and other documents,
depending on the particular law involved? While such problems would
not be so acute to the carriers if only United States courts and carriage
to and from the United States were involved, the international character
of the carriage involved makes these problems very real and places the
carriers in a difficult position. As the dissent in Lisi stated:
Were actual notice to be the requirement, every airline would have to have
its agent explain to every passenger the legal effect of the treaty and, in all
probability, insist that each passenger be represented by counsel who would
certify that he had explained the import of the Convention to his client who,
in turn, both understood and agreed to the limitation."'
"For a complete discussion of tariffs in United States law, see Pratt, Tariff Limitations on
Air Carriage Contracts, 29 J. AIR L. & COM. 14 (1963).
"Warsaw Convention, art. 1, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876.
"Calkins, Grand Canyon, Warsaw Convention and The Hague Protocol, 23 J. AIR L. & COM.
253, 261 (1956).
67 See note 57 supra.
6' Warsaw Convention, art. 3(1)(e), 49 Stat. 3015, T.S. No. 876.
69 See note 57 supra.
70370 F.2d at 515.
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As noted by the Second Circuit, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
had disapproved of the form of the documents involved in Lisi and the
language of the statements contained therein." With the addition of some
changes to cover the Montreal Agreement,"2 the carriers are now provid-
ing the required CAB notice and are prepared to prove it in future liti-
gation.
While compliance with the CAB's new document standards would seem
to make the question of notice in Lisi and similar cases moot, such is not
the case. As stated by Harold Caplan,"a the CAB is not the court which
rules on the adequacy of a particular document in a lawsuit, and the CAB
cannot guarantee that the courts of the United States or any other country
will approve such documents.' There is also some doubt as to the authority
of the CAB to prescribe notice requirements for international flights by
carriers of nations other than the United States."
Unless the CAB or some similar standards are found to be controlling,
it is doubtful that the carriers can ever produce a ticket or other docu-
ment which will completely satisfy the requirements set by the Second
Circuit." In effect, the Second Circuit would require that the carrier take
every effort to deliver to the passenger notice that is both, as a matter of
law, readable and understandable as to the applicability of the Convention
to a particular flight.
Much of the controversy concerning the Lisi decision has come from
international circles, not only from foreign airlines, but also from govern-
ments. If Lisi is allowed to stand, the confidence of many of the Contract-
ing Parties in the Convention may be seriously undermined.7 The Lisi
decision has already received serious consideration in the House of Com-
mons of the United Kingdom." The United Kingdom has shown that it
will follow the decision in Grey v. American Airlines, Inc.7 ' by reaching
a similar decision in Preston v. Hunting Air Transp., Ltd."0 as to the
71 The form specified by the CAB may be found in 14 C.F.R. § 221.175 (1965). The Hague
Conference rejected a proposal by the United States that notice must be printed in certain colors
and type sizes. See I ICAO, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AIR LAW 1955 at 60,
75, 124, ICAO Doc. No. 7686-LC/140 (1956).
72 Civil Aeronautics Board Order No. E-23680, 13 May 1966.
" Assistant Manager, The British Aviation Insurance Co. Ltd., London, England.
'4Caplan, Insurance, Warsaw Convention, Changes Made Necessary by the 1966 Agreement
and Possibility of Denunciation of the Convention, 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 663, 669 (1967).
" The CAB derives its authority over foreign carriers from the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
§ 402, 72 Stat. 754, 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (1964), which gives the Board the power to issue permits
to foreign carriers before they may operate in the United States. The Act provides that the CAB
has the power to "prescribe the duration of any permit" and to "attach to such permit such
reasonable terms, conditions, or limitations as . . . the public interest may require." However,
this power is limited by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1102, 72 Stat. 797, 49 U.S.C. §
1502 (1964), which provides that: "In exercising and performing their powers and duties . . .
the Board . . . shall do so consistently with any obligation assumed by the United States in any
treaty, convention, or agreement . . . . Whether the CAB's power under the above section
extends to authority over foreign carrier documentation is doubtful. Until the question is decided
by the courts or settled by further legislation, carriers cannot be certain that by complying with
the CAB standard that they will also satisfy the Lisi doctrine.
76 PANEL OF EXPERTS ON LIMITS FOR PASSENGERS UNDER THE WARSAW CONVENTION AND
THE HAGUE PROTOCOL, REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE SECOND SEsSIoN, PE-Warsaw Report-2,
Annex 1(4), 18 July 1967.
" Caplan, supra note 74.
7SHouse of Commons: 740 Official Report 139 (8 Feb. 1967), Col. 1576-91.
7995 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), aff'd, 227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 989 (1956).
80 [1956] 1 Q.B. 454.
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interpretation of the notice and delivery standards of Article 3. If other
Contracting Parties should follow the Grey and Preston decisions and if
Lisi should become the law in the United States, the most important pur-
pose of the Convention, uniformity of international law, will be under-
mined. If Lisi should be accepted by other nations, uniformity will be
achieved, but the carriers will have to bear the costs of potentially unlimited
liability every time a judge or jury decides that proper notice was not
given. Considering he difficulties of notice already discussed, there are
doubts in some areas of the air industry that the Warsaw Convention
could survive effectively." Other extreme views hold that even if the
carriers are able to satisfy the Lisi standards, the court in the United
States will find other defects in order to avoid the Convention limits, and
that the Warsaw Convention system is, in effect, already a dead issue."
V. CONCLUSION
Had the Lisi case involved purely domestic issues and statutes, the de-
cision would have been quite proper, in fact would have been admirable
as protecting the rights of the individual citizen, in the light of public
policy as to notice of limited liability in the United States. However, Lisi
involved a multi-lateral treaty that is recognized as one of the most suc-
cessful and important in international commercial law, and the effects of
the decision will be worldwide. The Second Circuit emphasized the need
to protect the passenger, especially the United States citizen, who is not
familiar with the limited liability concept. Yet, the signatory nations have
not ignored the passenger, and have tried to protect him by properly
amending the Convention and by providing for other mandatory agree-
ments. As noted in the dissent in Lisi, the Second Circuit has imposed its
own concept of what is required for the protection of the passenger under
the Convention, and has rejected the clear intent of the drafters. If the
Convention is unsatisfactory from the viewpoint of the passenger, it is
not the duty of the courts to change it to suit existing conditions, but it




' Kreindler, A Plaintiff's View of Montreal, 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 528, 535 (1967).
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Torts - Negligence - Res Ipsa Loquitur
Plaintiff's decedent was a passenger on Northwest Airlines' Douglas
DC-7C airliner when it crashed into the Pacific Ocean off the coast of
Canada, killing all aboard. The cause of the crash was unknown, and no
evidence of negligence after the plane took off was produced, although
the airline offered some proof of general care prior to that time. The Illinois
Federal District Court applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to find
the airline liable under the Death on the High Seas Act.' Held, Affirmed
in part: "[The] finding of negligence was a permissible one-warranted
though not compelled ... and ... the court's conclusion on the issue of
applicant's liability is thus supported by the evidence and the application
of correct legal criteria." Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 10 Av. Cas.
5 17,251, 379 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1967).
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is used to establish the defendant's
breach of duty. The Latin phrase itself originated in 1863 when Baron
Pollock used it in an argument with counsel,' but there was nothing
magical about it then, and time has confused rather than clarified its
meaning. It applies to those cases in which there may be a reasonable
inference of actionable negligence from the very happening of an event.
Because the doctrine goes to the element of breach of duty, the plaintiff
must first establish that the defendant owed him a duty of care. In air-
line crash cases it is easy to show a duty owed, but res ipsa must often be
relied on to show a breach.
Three classic conditions must be present to apply res ipsa loquitur.'
Basically, they are:
(1) The event must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in
the absence of negligence.
This criterion is based on simple probability. It has been pointed out that
the requirement is "only another way of stating an obvious principle of
circumstantial evidence: that the event must be such that in the light of
ordinary experience it gives rise to an inference that someone must have
been negligent."
(2) The instrumentality causing the injury must be under the exclu-
sive control of the defendant.
It is never enough for the plaintiff to prove mere negligence--he must
also show that his injury was caused by the defendant. In res ipsa loquitur
'41 Stat. 537-38 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1964).
'Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863).
3W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 39 (3rd ed. 1964); 9 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, § 2509(A) (3d ed.
1940).
4 W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 218. See also Foltis, Inc. v. New York, 287 N.Y. 108, 38
N.E.2d 455 (1941).
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this is accomplished by a process of elimination in which the most reason-
able of all the possible causes are those shown to be controlled by the de-
fendant.
(3) The plaintiff must not have contributed to his own injury.
In addition to eliminating third parties as tortfeasors, the plaintiff
must also eliminate his own conduct as a cause of his injury. Restatement
(Second) of Torts states, "Where the evidence fails to show a greater
probability that the event was due to the defendant's own conduct, the
inference of the defendant's responsibility cannot be drawn."5
Some courts discuss a fourth condition for the application of res ipsa
loquitur, which is that the evidence of the cause of the injury must be
more accessible to the defendant than to the plaintiff.! It would seem that
this amounts to an observation on the usual state of affairs, since he who
is in exclusive control of something almost always knows the most about
it. However, it does not follow that because this is normal it should be
indispensable, and most courts,' as well as Prosser' and Restatement
(Second) of Torts,' feel that it is not necessary. Clearly, if the circum-
stances warrant an inference that the defendant was negligent, the case
should not be dismissed simply because such negligence happened to result
in the type of accident which made evidence available to the defendant as
well as to the plaintiff.
In the majority of jurisdictions, the procedural effect of res ipsa loquitur
is that of a permissible inference, whereby the jury may find for the plain-
tiff if it so chooses."
Thus if the defendant rests at the close of the plaintiff's case the fact that
res ipsa loquitur has been applicable does not indicate that the plaintiff is
entitled to a directed verdict as a matter of law. The res ipsa inference is
one that the jury may draw, but does not have to draw."
Prior to World War II, most courts felt the safety record of aviation
was still too uncertain to justify holding that the very fact of a plane's
crash meant that someone had probably been negligent. If a non-negligent
cause was a possible explanation, the courts were unwilling or unable to
determine that a negligent cause was probable; and res ipsa was only rarely
applied." The attitude of the times is perhaps most poetically described in
'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 328D(i) (Pamp. 3 1965).
'Hughes v. Jolliffe, 313 P.2d 678 (Dept. 1, Sup. Ct., Wash. 1957); Levendusky v. Empire
Rubber Mfg. Co., 87 A. 338 (N.J. 1913).
7Backman v. Des Marais, 3 Av. Cas. 5 18,061, 100 F. Supp. I (D. Alas. 1951), aff'd sub.
nom., 3 Av. Cas. 5 18,062, 198 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1952), cert denied, 344 U.S. 922 (1953);
Smith v. Pennsylvania Cent. Airlines Corp., 76 F. Supp. 940 (D.D.C. 1948).
' W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 227, 228.
'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 328D(k) (Pamp. 3 1965).
"Lobel v. American Airlines, Inc., 192 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 945
(1952); Calhoun v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 180 F.Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Orme v. Burr,
157 Fla. 378, 25 So. 2d 870 (1946); Judd v. Sams, 186 Misc. 1044, 62 N.Y.S.2d 678 (1946);
Foltis, Inc. v. New York, 287 N.Y. 108, 38 N.E.2d 455 (1941). A few jurisdictions hold that
res ipsa creates a presumption of negligence, rather than in inference. In these jurisdictions, if
the defendant produces no evidence, the plaintiff is entitled to a directed verdict.
" 1 L. KRIENDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW, § 3.09[6] (1963).
"UMorrison v. Le Tourneau Co., 138 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1943); Cohn v. United Air Lines
Transp. Corp., 17 F. Supp. 865 (D. Wyo. 1937). Contra., Smtih v. Pacific Alas. Airways, 89
P.2d 253 (9th Cir., cert. denied, 302 U.S. 700 (1937).
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Cohen v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., a 1937 case, where the court
stated:
It may be that in the not too distant future in the evolution and develop-
ment of the wonderful and enchanting science of aviation, a sufficient fund
of information and knowledge may be afforded to make a safe basis in com-
pensating for injuries sustained, the application of the doctrine here invoked;
but it seems to me quite clear that that time has not yet arrived."
The general trend toward allowing res ipsa loquitur in airline crash
cases began after the war." The airplane no longer awed the public, and
technological advancement had made flying relatively safe. The shift in
attitude since the war is summarized by the court in Rogow v. United
States:
In the early days of aviation, perhaps, it could have been said that planes
crashed frequently and mysteriously through no fault of pilot or mainten-
ance personnel. But great technical progress in the last few years has brought
the art of flying to the state where aircraft do not generally meet disaster
in the absence of some negligence."5
Thus, as air safety has become increasingly sophisticated, the airlines
must maintain higher standards for the courts to find they used "reason-
able care." Because most hazards today can be anticipated and avoided,
the doctrine of res ipsa permits the jury to infer that when an accident does
occur, someone failed to take the necessary precautions. An example of
how these elements are presented to the jury is the charge given in the
leading case of Citrola v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.:
You may infer from the very happening of the crash, since it was not an
ordinary event happening in the course of [landing] that the crash was
occasioned by some negligent act of the operators of the airplane. It is an
"aMorrison v. Le Tourneau Co., 138 F.2d 399 (sth Cir. 1943); Cohn v. United Air Lines
Transp. Corp., 17 F. Supp. 865, 869 (D. Wyo. 1937). Accord, Wilson v. Colonial Air
Transport, 278 Mass. 420, 180 N.E. 212 (1932); Herndon v. Gregory, 190 Ark. 702, 81 S.W.2d
849 (1935); Smith v. Whitley, 27 S.E.2d 442 (N.C. Sup. Ct. 1943); Towle v. Phillips, 180
Tenn. 121, 172 S.W.2d 806 (1943); Boulineaux v. Knoxville, 20 Tenn. App. 404, 99 S.W.2d
557 (1935).
" The first case to reflect this post-war change in attitude was Smith v. Pennsylvania Cent.
Airlines Corp., 76 F. Supp. 940 (D.D.C. 1948). The court stated at 945:
The progress of aviation has been rapid. In the course of comparatively few years, it
has reached a point at which a host of transport airplanes flying according to fixed
schedules over a network of permanent routes, carry thousands of passengers an-
nually. Airplane lines vigorously compete with railroads and steamships. Those re-
sponsible for the remarkable and swift growth and development of aviation can
justifiably boast of a superb record of unparalleled and rapid achievement and
success. Accomplishment must be accompanied by responsibility. No reason is discern-
ible why the principles that govern the liability of other common carriers, such as
railroads, should not be equally applicable to transport airplanes operating as
common carriers [Emphasis added.].
A case particularly significant to air law is Backman v. Des Marais, 100 F. Supp. 1 (D.
Alas. 1951), aff'd sub, nona., 198 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 922 (1953),
in which the plane on which the plaintiff's decedent was a passenger disappeared without a
trace ,and neither party had any knowledge as to the cause of such disappearance. The court
allowed Yes ipsa loquitur in spite of the fact that the defendant's knowledge was not superior
to the plaintiff's, on the ground that an "equality of ignorance" would not preclude the use of
the doctrine. This is significant to air law because airplane crashes by their very nature fre-
quently destroy the evidence of their cause.
" Rogow v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 547, 556 (S.D. N.Y. 1959). Accord, Capital Air-
lines v. Barger, 47 Tenn. App. 636, 341 S.W.2d 579 (1960).
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inference you may draw but you are not required to draw from such find-
ings. The fact that the law permits you to draw this inference . . . does not
shift the ultimate burden of proof to the defendant in any way, not even the
burden of offering an explanation as to how or why the crash occurred; the
burden still rests with the plaintiff of establishing to your satisfaction by a
preponderance of the evidence that the negligence of the defendant was the
substantial factor contributing to causing the crash.1"
The instant case, Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., is a classic example
of the modern trend in res ipsa loquitur as applied to airline crashes. Here
the cause of the crash at sea was wholly unexplained, and there was no
evidence of specific negligence or even unusual circumstances surrounding
the crash. On appeal, the airline argued unsuccessfully that, because it
showed some proof of due care, res ipsa would have no application without
at least minimal evidence of specific negligence to sustain the plaintiff's
burden of proof. The court followed the general rule17 that on the issue
of breach of duty, the plaintiff may go to the jury with res ipsa alone
unless the defendant's evidence of care is such that no reasonable man
could find for the plaintiff.
The increasing application of res ipsa loquitur to unexplained air crashes
has significant practical implications. Depending on the circumstances of
the crash itself, the doctrine may impose the equivalent of strict liability
on an airline failing to explain why a crash occurred. Although the air-
lines may oppose such a result, there are two strong public policy argu-
ments in its favor: (1) Assuming that neither the airline nor the passenger
was at fault, the airline is best able to bear the loss. Even if this burden
is later shifted to all passengers in general by increased fares, the passengers
are still better able to bear the burden as a class than as individuals. (2)
The airline is in a position to develop better techniques to ascertain the
causes of crashes and prevent them; the individual passenger is not. The
prospect of liability for all unexplained crashes is obviously a very real
economic incentive to explain or prevent as many crashes as possible.
Nancy A. Ellsworth
16Citrola v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 264 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1959). Similar charges in Calhoun
v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 532, 533 (S.D. N.Y. 1959). Accord, Bratt v. Western
Airlines, Inc., 169 F.2d 214 (10th Cir. 1948); Trihey v. Transocean Air Lines, 255 F.2d 824
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 838 (1958); Lobel v. American Airlines, 192 F.2d 217 (2d
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 945 (19S2); Judd v. Sams, 186 Misc. 1044, 62 N.Y.S.2d 679
(1946).
" J. C. Penney Co. v. Forrest, 183 Okla. 106, 80 P.2d 640 (1938); Evans v. Missouri Pac.




Warsaw Convention - Limited Liability
Notice Requirement
Plaintiff's decedent purchased a round trip ticket from New York to
Vancouver, which provided for her return by way of Seattle and Chicago.
As a result of some unforeseen event, plaintiff's decedent was required to
travel from Vancouver to Seattle, by bus where she continued under the
original contract of carriage to Chicago. At Chicago another carrier was
substituted for the scheduled carrier for the flight to New York; it was
during this final leg of the journey that the fatal crash occurred. Plaintiff
alleged that the Warsaw Convention does not apply because the contract-
ing carrier did not perform all of the actual carriage and, in the alterna-
tive, moved to dismiss defendant's affirmative defense under the liability
limitation provisions of the Convention on the ground that "almost un-
readable 4 '/2 point" print on the airline ticket warning of the carrier's
limited liability did not constitute adequate notice as required by Article
3 (1) (e) of the Convention. Held: The contract of carriage was governed
by the Warsaw Convention, but due to inadequate notice, plaintiff's
motion to dismiss defendant's affirmative defense should have been granted.
Egan v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 10 Av. Cas. 5 17,651, 36 U.S.L.W.
2441 (N.Y. Ct. App. 28 Dec. 1967).
"The contract embodying the original ticket issued in this case was un-
doubtedly for international transportation since, in the words of the
Convention (art. [2]), it provided for 'an agreed stopping place within
a territory . . .of another power.' "" It was determined that the flight
from Chicago to New York was part of the original contract and, hence,
was governed by the Convention, since it was the original carrier which
obtained the ticket for the final leg of the journey. Article 3 0 (1) specific-
ally provides that any successive air carrier who accepts passengers under
a contract of international transportation is "subject to the rules set out
in this convention. . . ." Plaintiff contended that because of the bus trip
from Vancouver the later flights were not performed by "successive air
carriers" as required by Article 1 (3). It was further maintained that in
order for the subsequent domestic flights to be controlled by the Conven-
tion, the international portion of the journey must be completely by air.
However, the court found to the contrary. Since the original carrier was
named as a successive carrier in the contract of carriage, the court held
the Convention applicable so long as the flight was performed pursuant
to the contract.
Article 3 (1) (e) requires an airline to deliver a passenger ticket which
1Egan v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 10 Av. Cas. 5 17,651, 17,653 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1967).
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contains a "statement that the transportation is subject to the rules re-
lating to liability established by this convention." While there was agree-
ment that there was literal compliance with this requirement, the court
went on to inquire whether such compliance satisfied the overall objectives
of the Convention and found that "a statement which cannot reasonably
be deciphered fails of its purpose . . . of affording notice. . . " The court
rejected the carrier's argument that Ross v. Pan American Airways' re-
quires physical delivery only on the ground that Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee
Aeree Italiane' declares that an unreadable warning of limitation does not
afford adequate notice. In addition, in 1963 the CAB adopted regulations
requiring that the statement concerning limitations "be printed in type
at lease as large as ten point modern . . . ."' For the above described reasons,
the court determined that the carrier had failed to fulfill the "national
policy requiring that air carriers give passengers clear and conspicuous
notice before they will be permitted to limit their liability for injuries
caused by their negligence." This decision is of particular value to those
who have followed with interest the progress of the newly defined Lisi
doctrine.
M.E.D., Jr.
Warsaw Convention - Limited Liability - Charter Flights
On 2 February 1962, an Air France jet liner crashed at Orly Field,
Paris, France killing all 122 passengers aboard: all members of the Atlanta
Art Association that had entered into an International Charter Flight
Agreement with Air France to furnish the jet liner for the flight from
Atlanta to Paris. Plaintiffs instituted actions for wrongful death of the
passengers, seeking recovery of damages in an unlimited amount. Air
France, alleging the applicability of the Warsaw Convention limitation of
$8,291.87 per person, contended that the claims for unlimited damages
were contrary to the Warsaw Convention, the laws of France, and the
contract of carriage. Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judg-
ment, seeking dismissal of each part of the defenses asserting the applic-
ability of the Convention. The district court, denying the motion, held
that under the facts of the case the Warsaw Convention was applicable.'
Held, affirmed: Recovery by passengers under a contract of carriage on a
voyage charter flight is limited by the Warsaw Convention. Block, v.
Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967). appeal
docketed; No. 21609, 5th Cir., 5 Feb. 1968; petition for cert. filed, 36
U.S.L.W. 3317 (U.S. 13 Feb. 1968) (No. 1089).
'Egan v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 10 Av. Cas. 5 17,651, 17,654 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1967).
3299 N.Y. 88, 85 N.E.2d 880 (1949).
4370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. granted, 387 U.S. 901 (1967).
514 C.F.R. § 221.175 (1967).
' "[U] nder the factual situation in the cases at hand, where the Atlanta Art Association char-
tered an aircraft from Air France for the Carriage of passengers on a specific flight . . . (and)
where Air France, the air carrier, owns, operates, and controls the aircraft and, prior to departure,
delivers proper tickets to the passengers for their passage, the Warsaw Convention would be ap-
plicable." Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 229 F. Supp. 801 (N.D. Ga. 1964).
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Initially, the court discussed the background of the state of aviation at
the time the Convention was drafted and analyzed specific articles of the
Convention. They noted that on its face, the Convention covers all inter-
national carriage by air, Article 1 (1), with three exceptions, Articles 2 (2)
and 34, none of which covered the flight here involved. The court ob-
served that a specific provision probably would have been included had
the framers intended such an exception and concluded that to achieve
the uniformity sought, the Convention would have to be given a broad
construction. In answer to the plaintiffs' allegation that even without a
specific exception, the Convention did not apply here because coverage
is premised upon a direct contractual relationship, the court acknowledged
the necessity of a contract but held that the contract required was a con-
tract of carriage that arises from the relationship between a carrier and
the passengers.
To sum up, for a flight to come within the scope of the Warsaw Conven-
tion, the carrier must have agreed to carry the passenger, and both the carrier
and the passenger must have consented to the particular route. If the carrier
is an "air transportation enterprise" the passenger need not have paid or have
promised to pay, provided that the carrier has consented to transport the
passenger under those conditions. Finally, the passengers and the airline need
not have been in a position where they could bargain over the terms of
carriage.
The contractual relationship established between Air France and the pas-
sengers and evidenced by the individual issuance of these tickets fits the
description of the relationship required by the Warsaw Convention.
Responding to the plaintiffs' contention that limitations expressed in
the Convention and rejection of the Brazilian proposal to include charters
in the definition of the word "carrier" served as a rejection of any con-
nection between the Convention and charter flights, the court concluded:
[T]he history of the Convention, before and after Warsaw, shows that
the Warsaw Convention applies to a voyage charter flight. The question
courts must decide, within the context of each case is: Who is the Carrier?
In answering this question the court stated:
When a passenger is transported a contract of carriage exists whether or
not the transportation is undertaken pursuant to an air charter. It exists
regardless of the contractual relationships between the owner and the charterer
and between the charterer and the passenger. Here Air France was the carrier.
Air France assumed full contractual responsibility for the transportation of
the passengers. In recognition of that responsibility, Air France controlled
the aircraft and operated it through an Air France crew. A passenger's right
to be carried came into being only on the issuance and delivery of an individual
ticket by Air France showing on its face the airline's obligation to perform
the contract of transportation under the provisions of the Warsaw Conven-
tion.
The dissent was of the opinion that due regard for current public opin-




Governmental Liability - Air Traffic Control
Duty to Warn
Plaintiffs brought an action under the Federal Torts Claims Act1 against
the United States to recover for the death of a pilot and his passenger,
allegedly as a result of the negligence of air traffic control in its failure
to sufficiently discharge the duty to warn of the possible presence of wing
tip vortex of a larger DC-7 departing immediately ahead of the light
aircraft. In clearing the Bonanza for take-off shortly after a departing
DC-7, the controller warned, "Watch the prop wash." Plaintiffs appealed
from a lower court decision holding that the air traffic controller owed no
duty other than that of maintaining separation between the aircraft suffi-
cient to avoid a collision and, even though the controllers had no duty to
warn the Bonanza pilot of possible turbulence, the warning given was
sufficient. Held, reversed and remanded: The controller had a duty to
give a warning to the Bonanza of the possible danger from wing tip
vortex2 and the warning given by the controller was insufficient. Hartz
v. United States, 10 Av. Cas. 17,606 (5th Cir. 1968).
Although recognizing that the aircraft pilot is primarily responsible
for the operation of his aircraft, the appellate court stated that he must
first know all the facts which are material to safe operation. The court
further stated that the controller should have been aware of the danger
of the Bonanza taking-off closely behind a DC-7, and that because of the
controller's experience and his location on the airfield he was better quali-
fied to determine when the smaller airplane should have been cleared for
take-off. The pilot of the Bonanza should have been warned of the possible
danger of wing tip vortex turbulence by the method prescribed for con-
trollers in the Air Traffic Control Procedures Manual, rather than in the
language he actually used. The controller did not fulfill his duty to warn
the pilot of the impending danger in a manner which was sufficient, nor
did he satisfy the additional duty to delay take-off clearance for a reason-
able time in order to permit such turbulence from the DC-7 to dissipate.
The court thus found that the controller's breach of duty clearly was a
proximate cause of the crash of the Bonanza.
L.R.J., Jr.
'28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964).
2 Prop wash and wing tip vortex are not the same. Vortex is more hazardous and takes longer
to dissipate than does prop wash. The court stated that the controller's use of the term "prop
wash" may have led the pilot of the Bonanza to believe that "he would encounter a minimal
wind force which would not endanger his aircraft." Hartz v. United States, 10 Avi. 17,606 (5th
Cir. 1968).
Federal Aviation Act - Statutory Interpretation -
Inclusive Tours
An appeal was taken by three regular air carriers from a series of orders
of the Civil Aeronautics Board (hereinafter CAB or Board) granting five
supplemental air carriers (intervenors in this case) the right to engage
in "inclusive tours"' between the United States and various foreign coun-
tries. The petitioners appeal was based on the allegation that the CAB
lacked authority to allow these "inclusive tours." "Supplemental" is the
term used to designate air carriers that are not assigned regularly sched-
uled routes by the CAB and are restricted by the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958, as amended, to deal only in "charter trips in air transportation
• .. to supplement the scheduled service" authorized by the Board. The
focal point of this conflict revolved around the question of whether or
not the "inclusive tours" fit within the term "charter trips" which the
CAB has some discretion in defining. The CAB Proceeding from which
these orders evolved was the same one that issued inclusive tour authority
to ten "domestic" supplemental air carriers. The Board asserted that the
issue here presented had been decided by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia when it reviewed and affirmed the authorization of
domestic "inclusive tours," and therefore, that decision should be res
judicata to this appeal. In the alternative the Board stated that the Water-
man doctrine denied the court the right of review. Held, reversed and re-
manded: The legislative history of the amendment of the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958 concerning supplemental carriers, as drawn from explicit
statements (concerning the definition of "charater trips") made during
the floor debate on the amendment, conclusively demonstrated that the
Board acted outside its authority in granting supplemental carriers the
rights to engage in "inclusive tours." Pan American World Airways, Inc.
v. CAB, 380 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 36 U.S.L.W. 3308
(29 Jan. 1968).
The court blunted the res judicata defense on the ground that different
orders and parties were involved though the same issue, arising from the
same proceeding, was presented. A motion to transfer the appeal to the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was denied on the same
ground. Likewise, the tribunal avoided the Waterman doctrine by de-
claring that the judiciary is not denied the right to review a case when
the action taken, before the matter reaches the President, is beyond the
Board's power to act. The court then delved into the merits of the matter
placing major emphasis upon the fact that a conflict had existed between
the Senate and House versions of the bill pertaining to the term "charter
trips." The Senate proposal defined "charter trips" to include "inclusive
tours," while the House bill contained no definition whatsoever relating
'Inclusive tour is generally synonymous with an "all-expense" or "package" tour. The CAB
has adopted the term "inclusive tour" rather than "all-expense" tour because all expenses are not
necessarily required to be included in the tour price.
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to "charter trips." The Conference Committee reported out a compromise
offering (that eventually became the amendment) which deleted the
definition of "charter trips." Statements were specifically made in the
floor debate on the bill that the definition had been dropped by the Senate
proponents and that "inclusive tours" were not to be a part of "charter
trips."
The prior decision that affirmed the domestic "inclusive tours"' placed
little weight on the floor debate but considered in detail the effect of "in-
clusive tours" as authorized (which the court in the present case did not
consider at all) plus a previous decision which approved "split charters"'
of one aircraft to two different groups. The D.C. Circuit found "chapter
trips" had no fixed meaning and that Congress left the task of defining
the term to the CAB so as to be able to meet changing needs. The Second
Circuit reached a result diametrically opposed to the aforementioned views
and seemed to be a willing partner to the petitioner's desire to obtain a
hearing on this matter in the Supreme Court.'
If the statute's legislative history deliniates legislative intent, then the
Board literally exceeded its power to regulate when it granted "inclusive
tour" authority to the supplementals. On the other hand, the airline in-
dustry has enjoyed a tremendous amount of growth since 1962 and the
needs of the public may also have changed just as rapidly. In either case
it is now up to the Justices of the Supreme Court to decide.
E.G.S.
Negligence - Air Traffic Control - Weather Information
Plaintiff was injured in the crash of an aircraft owned by defendant,
True-Flite, Inc., and operated by its agent. The plane took off after re-
ceiving instructions from the tower that VFR conditions existed, and
shortly thereafter flew into some thick clouds and visual contact with the
ground was lost. Without ever having regained visual contact, the plane
crashed into a swamp, permanently injuring the pilot; plaintiff was in-
jured less severely. The two remained in the swamp approximately thirty
hours before aid arrived. Plaintiff alleges that True-Flite through its agent
was negligent in that he did not check local weather conditions before
takeoff since he knew that unfavorable conditions existed. Evidence was
also introduced that the pilot was negligent in the execution of the proper
2American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 365 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1966). For an extensive discussion
of this case and the general area of conflict between the regular and supplemental carriers, see Note,
Federal Aviation Act-Statutory Interpretation-Inclusive Tours, 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 179
(1967).
aAmerican Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 348 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1965), noted in 32 J. Am L. &
COM. 127 (1966). Prior to this decision the concept of "plane load" charter had been limited to
one group chartering the full capacity of a single aircraft.
4In the opinion under consideration (after evaluating the CAB's motion to transfer to the
D.C. Circuit and determining that it had jurisdiction over the appeal) the court stated at 774:
However, the Board argues that petitioners are guilty of forum-shopping, seeking
a determination from this court contrary to that reached by the District of Colum-
bia Circuit, thus enhancing their opportunity for review in the Supreme Court of the
legal issues here tendered.
The court then proceeded to deny the motion and determine the case contrary to the decision
reached by the District of Columbia Circuit.
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procedure to establish visual contact with the ground. An action was
brought against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act on
the ground that its agent, the tower operator, failed to give accurate infor-
mation to the pilot when he asked if VFR weather conditions existed.
Plaintiff further contended that the tower operator did not immediately
initiate search and rescue operations when the plane failed to return. Held:
Any airline that deliberately carries unsuspecting passengers into dangerous
weather which results in their death or injury shall be liable for the con-
sequences. De Vere v. True-Flight, Inc. United States of America, 268
F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.C. 1967).
The finding of negligence on the part of the carrier was based on the
fact that the pilot, in his flight into the airport to pick up the plaintiff,
observed the unfavorable weather conditions and, thus, it became his duty
to gain the latest information directly from the weather bureau. Since
pilots and airlines have knowledge of weather conditions superior to that
of passengers, they should be held strictly responsible when adverse weather
conditions are voluntarily encountered. This should be especially true in
light of the fact that a large number of airplane accidents occur in in-
climate weather.
The claim against the United States was dismissed. The court found by
records and testimony of a meteorologist that at the time of takeoff VFR
conditions did exist. Hence, the tower operator, although he was unable
to contact the weather bureau by phone to confirm that such a condition
existed, was not guilty of giving erroneous information. According to
regulations, the tower operator was not negligent in failing to begin a
search and rescue mission immediately. The duty to initiate such search
procedures arises when the operator has actual knowledge that an aircraft
is down. The court concluded here that the operator might reasonably
have believed the the aircraft had flown on to another airport.
J.A.M.
FOREIGN
Warsaw Convention - Article 25 - Unlimited Liability
A Milan company committed to K.L.M. Airlines three packages, weigh-
ing kg. 3,400, containing gold jewelry for delivery in New York. The
shipment was worth $5,000. At Kennedy Airport the packages were un-
loaded but left untended in an unlocked K.L.M. truck for approximately
one hour. They disappeared. Suit was brought by an Italian insurance com-
pany against K.L.M. after K.L.M. had claimed limited liability under,
Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention (damages of $56.) Held: Under the
total facts of the case K.L.M.'s negligent handling of the cargo amounted to
the equivalent of wilful misconduct under Article 25 of the Warsaw Con-
vention and, therefore, the carrier was liable for the full amount. Soc.
Agrippina v. K.L.M. Airlines,' Tribunal of Milan.
' This case is summarized from a translation of the complete text reprinted in 6 II Diritto Aero
(1967) (Italy). Translator: Tomaso Quattrin.
1967]
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The court found that the carrier had been fully apprised of the value of
the packages by a letter from the consignor. The lack of diligence on the
carrier's part to take special care of such small, highly valued packages
especially at nighttime, caused the court to consider such action extreme
negligence, and the equivalent of wilful misconduct under Article 25 of
the Warsaw Convention. Thus, the carrier had submitted itself to un-
limited liability, and was denied the right to avail itself of the limitations
of Article 22.
Conflict of Laws - Ticket Sales - Warsaw Convention
Plaintiff German corporation asked a Swiss citizen to buy plane tickets
on defendant German airline. The Swiss citizen ordered the tickets from
a Swiss travel agent in order to get a cheaper fare for international carriage.
Plaintiff corporation paid the Swiss citizen for the tickets and he was to pay
the travel agent. He never did. When the tickets were presented in
Munich for booking of the trip they were seized by defendant. Plaintiff
sought to rcover the amount paid for the tickets with defendant contend-
ing that the money had never been received. Held: According to applic-
able German law, the Swiss citizen was an agent of the plaintiff German
corporation, and therefore, plaintiff had never paid defendant. Ober-
landesgericht Kdln, 29 May 1967.
The court applied German and not Swiss law. This follows from a
limitation on the principle of German Private International Law that the
choice of law in respect to contracts depends on the intention of the par-
ties. That limitation provides that, where the parties have not made an
express agreement as to choice of law and no special interest of either
party warrants application of other than German law, German law will
apply. Here plaintiff and defendant were both German corporations domi-
ciled in Germany. Moreover, a printed clause on the back of the plane
tickets referred to Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention, which provision
provided that plaintiff had to sue in Germany and that German law was
to apply.
According to the German law of agency, the Swiss citizen (defendant's
actual contractual partner) was found to be plaintiff's agent because the
law of defendant's country controls. Just because an agent was involved
the choice of law did not change. Also, under the law of torts, German
law applied since Munich was the place where the seizure (refusal to book
the tickets) had occurred.
The highest German state court decided for defendant according to
the German Civil Code (§§ 326, 327) since plaintiff never gave anything
in performance of the contract and, therefore, had no grounds for re-
cission.
' The summary of this case is drawn from a translation of the full reprint of the case in 16
Zeitschrift filr Luftrecbt und Weltraumrechtsfragen (1967) (Germany). Translated by Rainer
Kasolowsky.
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